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Abstract
This thesis investigates the automotive industry within Mississippi through a Global
Value Chain lens. Through interviews conducted with economic developers affiliated with
Nissan and Toyota’s recruitment, this thesis highlights the effect these final assembly plants on
local economic development and the role these economic developers play in their recruitment.
The automobile industry within Mississippi behaves much like the automobile industry
elsewhere within the world as they tend to locate near final markets, drive the co-location of
suppliers, and remain long-lived institutions in the community. This thesis also illuminates the
role of state and local actors in recruiting the automotive industry. State and local actors actively
increase the value of industrial sites through pre-development in order to make their site more
“valuable” in the eyes of automobile firms, and these actors also play important roles in
showcasing the unique advantages of their sites and facilitating cooperation.
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Chapter 1: Theories of Development and Automotive Value Chains
Introduction
Since the mid-20th Century, scholars (Rostow 1960) have observed that, as nations grow
and develop, economic development is almost inherently unequal. Empirical works show that
some areas thrive as other remain static or even decline (Rose 1984, Smith 1978, Tausch 2018,
Escobar 2012). A substantive portion of the literature looks at examples of success, but
development and underdevelopment are not two different phenomena divorced from each other
but rather two sides of the same coin. The study of underdevelopment, the forces that create it,
and how to rectify it hold an equal importance. This thesis aims to contribute to the field of study
surrounding economic underdevelopment by looking at the example of the Mississippi
Automobile Industry and how it acts as a catalyst for economic development.
Early works on economic development conceptualize it as a linear process that grows
toward a final stage, an idea clearly represented by the most advanced industrial economies. This
typical view of development derives itself from Rostow theory. According to the Rostow theory
of development, underdevelopment and development share the same series of development, with
underdevelopment filling the role of a natural state that evolves into the development stage
(Dorfman 1991, Parr 2001, Rostow 1960).
However, theories such as Dependency theory, Postcolonial Development theory, and the
work of Arturo Escobar see underdevelopment as a condition brought onto parts of the world by
outside forces. Generally speaking, these theories claim that the concentration of wealth in the
‘developed’ parts of the world occurs, in part, due to the extraction of resources from elsewhere.
Thus, development in certain cities, regions, or countries creates impoverishment elsewhere.
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Among these scholars, Arturo Escobar introduces the idea that discourse among scholars,
primarily in the first world, imposes a state of underdevelopment on the minds of leaders in the
“underdeveloped” or “third world”. This imposed underdevelopment compels them to engage in
a world system that the “first world” has immense control over in order to try to correct it
(Bennet et. al 2017, McFarlane 2006, Radcliffe 2005, Noxolo 2016). Postcolonial development
theory intertwines the realities of colonial settlement by colonial powers with the development
outcomes of today. It traces these development outcomes to the institutions set in place by
colonial powers during settlement (I.e. exploitation and extraction vs. settlement and replication
of European institutions) (Bennet et. al 2017). Finally, dependency theory develops to the fullest
the stance that development and underdevelopment are deeply intertwined and caused by one
another. Dependency theory holds that underdevelopment occurring in the periphery of a society
results from economic motivations within the centre of a society. The primary forms of economic
development that take root in the periphery serve to feed economic systems of the centre,
through processes such as resource extraction, surplus labor value extraction, or simple
siphoning of laborers (Brewer 2002, Ghosh 2017, Parthasarathy 1994). As such, the
underdeveloped periphery depends on the centre for the continued existence of their industries
while also remaining in a perpetual cycle of underdevelopment.
Each of these theories vary in regards to how explicit the conditions of underdevelopment
are tied to outside forces, but all of them agree that underdevelopment is not simply the absence
of development. These theories reflect the larger trend of academic discourse which holds that
underdeveloped areas play as active of a role as developed areas do in the global system ushered
in by globalization. Most importantly, these theories highlight that the dynamic of development
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and underdevelopment is not only a matter of world regions or countries; instead, the same
dynamics exist within countries and even within regions. Within this same trend of academic
discourse, Global Value Chain (GVC) theory emerged as a widely used theory that is able to
explain development and underdevelopment at multiple levels throughout an increasingly
globalized world. GVC theory combines supply chain analysis from the business world with
elements of sociology. Through analyzing the flows of goods and services within a Global Value
Chain, scholars determine the nature of interactions between firms/ regions and the Value chain.
In particular, firms that capture the most value at their stage in the Value Chain (I.e. create the
most profit for themselves by adding value to the product), exert the most influence over the
organization of the Value Chain (Gereffi et. al 2005). These captured gains and resulting
influence allow firms to dictate the location of smaller firms as well as drive additional nearby
development (Gereffi et. al 2008).
Mississippi stands out as an incredible candidate for a study of this kind. Mississippi
offers a unique insight to study local level development occurring within a largely
underdeveloped region. Though largely underdeveloped for most of its history, certain industries
recently chose to set up shop within Mississippi due to its unique conditions. Most notably, in
2003, Nissan Group of North America established a final assembly factory for Nissan vehicles in
Canton, MS. Merely 8 years later, the Northeast Mississippi Toyota assembly plant also opened
its doors. The establishment of these two assembly plants allows for an in-depth analysis of
Mississippi’s location within global value chains and its ramifications on economic development.
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Topic and Importance
This paper examines the automobile industry in Mississippi through a global value chain
lens. In particular, this paper evaluates the impact that automobile value chains have on
economic development within Mississippi and how government actors engage in automotive
value chains. By understanding the role that these automotive value chains play in development
and how government actors successfully persuaded them to invest in Mississippi, it is possible to
outline how future government actors can attract similarly important industries in the future.
Gereffi et. al (2008) notes important trends within automobile production that have
important implications for economic development. Among these, automobile final assembly
plants tend to establish close to final markets. This occurs largely because of politics. These
firms experience the effects of legislation like other manufacturers; however, the potential for
political backlash if automobile companies produced in a foreign country plays a much more
unique role. Firms expect this political backlash against foreign production because of the high
cost and visibility of automobiles are visible reminders that the value of that product was
transferred to another country. Additionally, automobile final assembly plants drive the location
of close-to-end suppliers to more proximate regions. Within the GVC literature, lead firms plants
can drive the co-location of suppliers due to the firms’ power in the value chain. The final
assembly plants acts as the lead firm in this value chain because it functions as the primary
consumer for its close-to-end suppliers and can demand new products.
Pavlínek (2009) explores the automobile industry in Central Europe, an area which may
yield relevant comparisons to the American South because both are low-wage areas integrated in
large, highly affluent political units (respectively the US and the European Union). Pavlínek
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(2009) outlines why Automobile Transnational Corporations (TNC’s) have established
production facilities throughout Central and Eastern Europe as well as what the implications of
that investment are for economic development within those regions. Automobile TNC’s moved
manufacturing locations to Central Europe due to its combination of lower production costs and
geographic proximity to affluent markets.
According to traditional views of core-periphery, less developed economies in the
periphery should concentrate on their comparative advantages in cost-sensitive or labor-intensive
products (Pavlínek 2009, Ghosh 2017); however, the success of underdeveloped countries
attracting higher value-added segments of value chains undermines these traditional views (Faust
et al. 2004, Layan and Lung 2004 ). Pavlínek (2009) shows that Eastern Europe incorporated
higher value-added segments of the automobile supply chain, such as Research and Development
and engine production, into their country for the purpose of exporting or even domestic
production of vehicles. Part of the reason for this shift is that these regions adapted to the
presence of TNC’s and accommodated them. TNC’s elected to continue investment in Central
Europe over other possibilities because Central Europe had a population which could meet their
demands for skilled workers while also having lower wages for skilled work, weak trade unions
and flexible labor laws, and governmental incentives (Pavlínek 2009).
These findings from Gereffi et. al (2008) and Pavlínek (2009) suggest that the automobile
industry is uniquely situated to move production to underdeveloped areas, especially when those
areas are within close geographic proximity to affluent markets. Additionally, as Gereffi et. al
(2008) shows, the existence of these automobile manufacturers causes numerous downstream
effects such as the co-location of lower level suppliers. Finally, as both Gereffi et. al (2008) and
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Pavlínek (2009) show, the automobile industry remains a static entity due to the immense
investment required to establish factories as well as how susceptible they are to influence from
policy actions, whether those policies are in place or threatened. In short, previous works suggest
that the automobile industry can be brought to less developed areas, influenced to stay in those
areas, and spark waves of economic development to follow.
These thesis seeks to establish whether the outcomes of automobile final assembly plants
opening shop in Mississippi align with the predictions of Gereffi et. al (2008) and Pavlínek
(2009). Additionally, this thesis seeks to elaborate on the role of state and local actors play in the
process of recruiting these automobile firms.
How the Thesis Will Develop
Following this introduction, the first chapter will explore the theories of economic
development. This discussion traces the evolution of theories surrounding economic
development in order to highlight how underdevelopment has been understood throughout time.
This literature review will pay particular attention to Global Value Chain theory by exploring
both the foundational literature of the topic and local level applications of the theory. Global
Value Chain theory is especially equipped to explain the role of underdeveloped regions and how
they can both interact in the global system and gain more power within it. Before transitioning
to the second chapter, this paper will cover the methodology
The second chapter will begin to link this literature to the reality of economic
development in Mississippi. This chapter will be more akin to a macro level analysis showing the
trend of economic development in Mississippi on a state level. This analysis begins in the
antebellum, agrarian society of Mississippi and highlights how the history of slavery and
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sharecropping contributed to the underdevelopment of Mississippi. From there, it outlines the
history of the Balance Agriculture with Industry program started by Mississippi in the 1930’s and
its role in industrializing the state. Finally, it analyzes the state’s economic history through both
dependency theory and Global Value chain theory.
The third chapter will be an empirical chapter that centers on the Nissan Automobile
Final Assembly plant in Canton, MS and the Toyota Final Assembly Plant in Blue Springs, MS.
These plants were highly sought after manufacturers which numerous levels of government
involved themselves with in order to ensure their investment. This chapter will discuss how these
firms affected the creation of numerous downstream suppliers. Additionally, this chapter will
discuss interviews with local and state level policy makers in the attempt to outline the role that
these actors played in influencing development.
The fourth and final chapter will serve as the conclusion. This chapter will place the
important findings of the paper into a consistent narrative of how policy and industry behaved in
Mississippi in the context of Global Value Chain theory. Additionally, my paper will offer
suggestions for policy makers regarding economic development.
Literature Review
Scholars generally accept that economic development functions to improve the material
conditions of an area. The reason for the general acceptance of this notion is largely based on the
foundations of modern thought regarding economics and economic development. Theories on
economic development formed near the beginning of the 20th century. At this time, Western
scholars tried to determine what enabled the modernization of societies and economies to take
place. These attempts attempted to simultaneously portray what elements propelled developed

!11
nations to enter into the modern, industrial era and what elements kept nations in a condition of
underdeveloped “backwardness”.
Out of these initial theories, Rostow’s theory of development gained popularity. Rostow
theorized economic development as occurring in 5 distinct stages - traditional society,
preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and age of high mass consumption
(Rostow 1960, Dorfman 1991, Parr 2001). This approach to development obviously originated
from ideas about the western world. Because Rostow created his model in the 1950’s and 1960’s,
his model closely followed the historical examples of the United States and Western European
countries (Parr 2001). At the time, these countries epitomized “modern” economies in the eyes of
many academics because they embraced corporations and industrialization. As such, Rostow’s
model of linear development most clearly applied to older regions of the western world which
had begun development in relatively closed economies (Parr 2001).
Rostow’s model did what it set out to do, but clear problems emerged. Foster-Carter
(1976) represents these problems as largely arising out of an intellectual paradigm. Rostow’s
model, as well as the underlying thoughts which guided his approach, largely dominated the
conversation about economic development and underdevelopment. However, the world that
Rostow theorized about changed rapidly. In an increasingly globalized world, regions could no
longer begin their early stages of development in the relatively closed economies that aligned so
well with his theories. In addition to this breakdown, empirical and theoretical challenges
emerged against Rostow’s stance that underdeveloped countries remained underdeveloped and
“backward” due to their institutions.
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The school of dependency theory poses a prominent challenge to Rostow’s theory of
development. Scholars operating within dependency theory maintain the global economy
cultivated a system where the “centre" (developed nations of the world) fueled its development
by draining resources from the “periphery” (the underdeveloped nations of the world), leaving
the periphery in a perpetual state of underdevelopment (Ghosh 2017). The extraction of
resources creates industries intertwined with this extraction as well as a consequential lack of
resources. Thus, the periphery lacks the means of developing on its own, and its current
industries depend on the centre for their continued existence (Ghosh 2017).
Dependency theory accounts for development and underdevelopment in ways that
Rostow’s theory could not. Dependency theory explains that development and underdevelopment
were tied together and fueled by one another rather than simple byproducts of a system. This
connection results from an increasingly globalized world, one that Rostow’s model was unable to
account for and model correctly. Underdeveloped countries remained at risk for exploitation by
the developed countries of the centre so long as they were connected to the global economy
which explains how rapid development could occur in the economic center while perpetual status
of underdevelopment (Parthasarathy 1994, Tausch 2018, Ghosh 2017).
This new take on economic development presented new opportunities for scholars, and
new thoughts on economic development emerged that incorporated elements of dependency with
other ideas. Among these, Postcolonial Development theory stands out. Postcolonial
Development theory posits that the legacy that colonial powers leave upon their former colonies
drastically affects development outcomes (Bennett et. al 2017, Radcliffe 2005, Noxolo 2016).
Within these legacies, multiple factors can drastically affect development outcomes. For

!13
example, scholars theorize that the system of law which former colonies have adopted play a
significant role. This idea marks a substantial departure from the theories of linear development
like Rostow and dependency theory because it develops the idea that policy does affect
development outcomes. Additionally, whether the original purpose of the former colonies were
meant to extract valuable commodities or be areas of settlement plays an important role in the
development of former colonies (Bennett et. al 2017). These theories draw on the idea of created
dependency that Dependency Theory is built on because it states that the political economic
institutions that were established by the colonial power were intentionally subservient and have
entrenched those legacies.
Once the general principles of postcolonial development took hold, scholars began to
dive deeper into how these colonial legacies could manage to exist and perpetuate global
inequality in our modern age. Arturo Escobar (2012) adds that through the lens of discourse
among western academics and economic institutions, the global south began to perceive
themselves as “third world” and “underdeveloped”. As such, the rulers of these countries turn to
those scholars and economic institutions for assistance. By doing so, they willingly submit
themselves to participating in a global economic system that sought to export labor intensive
manufacturing jobs to them and siphon off resources and value from them. By pointing these
methods and legacies out, postcolonial development scholars hoped to challenge the power
structures of our global economic order that perpetuated economic inequality. In doing so, they
hoped to create a shift that could push academics to begin to look at development with a
regionally specific approach (Noxolo 2016).
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Stepping away from academic theories surrounding economic development and global
trade, it becomes clear that the power structures Postcolonial Development critiqued were
rapidly changing. The shifting of manufacturing jobs from the economic centre to the periphery
removed the sense of certainty surrounding the international division of labor that dependency
theory and postcolonial theory had predicted (Pavlínek 2009). As such, a new theory arose that
could better explain this rapidly changing world called Global Value Chain (GVC) theory. GVC
theory brings together elements of transaction cost economics, production networks, and
technological capability and firm-level learning into a singular theory to analyze the evolving
structure of global trade (Gereffi et. al 2005).
GVC theory is especially applicable to studies of development in a globalized world
because it is able to effectively integrate firm specific advantages with location specific
advantages (Gereffi et. al 2001, Gereffi et. al 2005, Pavlínek 2009). While postcolonial and
dependency theory focuses on macro-level dynamics at the level of nations of world regions,
GVC theory lends itself to micro-level analyses – at the subnational and also local level. In
particular, GVC theory can show dynamics of development/underdevelopment within rich
countries – and allow for the possibilities of resource extractions from poorer to richer regions of
the same country. In particular, the decision of leading firms of the chain to locate more or less
profitable economic activities in certain places instead of others has far reaching effects. GVC
recognizes the dynamic nature of development. Because valuable firms may establish pieces of
their value chain in underdeveloped regions of the world, those new industries do not have to
remain in a state of constant dependence on the economic center or whatever world power it has
ties to. Depending on the type of industry, the types of power structures within supply chains
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wield varying degrees of control. The degrees of control depend upon the complexity of their
interactions, their ability to codify their transactions, and the capabilities of the supply base
(Gereffi et. al 2005). In addition to its integration of location specific analysis with firm specific
analysis, GVC theory also outlines how underdeveloped areas can facilitate firm upgrading. In
some power structures, lead firms hold the vast majority of the value added stages within their
element of the supply chain; however, other firms in less dominated value chains can capture
more value in their segment of the supply chain (Gereffi et. al 2011).
In particular, GVC theory is especially well equipped to study the automotive industry
due to its complex value chain structure. Petr Pavlínek (2009) looks at the automobile industry
that had recently begun to spread into Central Europe. In his work, he found that Central
European countries increased their share of value in the supply chain of automobiles. Firms
shifted their production to Central Europe because these countries were proximate to other
factories within Western Europe, there were few trades barriers, and there was a sizable
population of cheaper labour that could produce these parts at a lower cost. However, the
increase in Central Europe’s share of value largely results from economic upgrading on the part
of the firm. These firms expanded their operations from simple production to include more
valuable tasks such as routine research and development functions.
Methodology
In order to gather data needed for this study, I will conduct interviews with economic
developers that worked to recruit automobile manufacturers within Mississippi. These interviews
will be recorded and transcribed, and important data from the interviews will be elaborated on in
the empirical chapter.
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The automobile industry within Mississippi has two major actors which are the Toyota
final assembly plant in Northeast Mississippi and the Nissan final assembly plant in Central
Mississippi. Nissan opened its doors in 2003 and was largely recruited by state level actors.
Toyota opened its doors in 2011, and local and state level actors played a role in its recruitment.
The dynamic between these two firms poses a unique opportunity for researchers to study the
role of state and local level actors in recruiting automobile manufacturers to invest in Mississippi
as well as what downstream economic development effects occurred due to their investment.
As such I will interview economic developers from both projects, and these interviews
will revolve around two research questions: Question A) What is the role of the automotive
industry in the larger dynamic of economic development? and Question B) What are the role of
state and local actors in actively recruiting automobile manufacturers?
In asking Question A, this study attempts to ascertain what trends are specific to the
automobile industry and why they are important to economic development. Additionally, policy
makers and economic developers had already reached a consensus on the importance of the
automobile industry, so this study will also explore their specific motivations for targeting the
automobile industry as a key driver of economic development. Finally, I will compare these
answers to the reality that automotive producers and the communities they inhabit face to see if
this holds up.
In order to answer Question A, I will ask economic developers what the economies of
these regions looked like before and what suppliers established their operations alongside these
automobile final assembly plants. Furthermore, I will ask economic developers to elaborate on
why economic developers believed the automobile industry was so conducive to generating
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further economic development. Through answering these question, I will gain insight into
whether or not GVC literature surrounding the automobile industry holds up in Mississippi as
well as valuable insight into the downstream effects of these firms.
In asking Question B, this study attempts to add a new contribution to the study of
automotive value chains. Previous work on automotive value chains emphasizes the role of very
generalized political pressures and incentives in influencing automotive firm’s decisions. By
asking this question though, I explore how multiple levels of government affiliated actors
actively employed multiple strategies to recruit automobile manufacturers.
In order to answer Question B, I will ask economic developers what sorts of strategies
they implemented and what specific tasks they performed in order to recruit these manufacturers.
Through answering these questions, I will better understand what different levels of government
are capable of doing in recruiting industry. Hopefully, by illuminating these actions and how
successful they were, a better picture for how to recruit valuable industries and facilitate their
expansion may emerge.
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Chapter 2: The Economic History of Mississippi
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is investigate the economic development of Mississippi and
how the automobile industry affects economic development through the lens Global Value Chain
theory. Such a paper assumes that the economy of Mississippi and the South are actually
separable from the broader United States Economy. Though this distinction may be less evident
today, there certainly was a separate Southern economy for quite some time. This distinctive
Southern economy is largely defined by its low-wage labor market and extractive industries
(Wright 1986).
Throughout its history, the economy of Mississippi encompassed these elements. For
much of the early 20th century, Mississippi’s economy solely depended upon agriculture namely cotton. This agricultural production was largely located in the Mississippi Delta region
and relied heavily upon enslaved labor. This use of enslaved labor and the legacies of it actively
prevented economic development. Following the American Civil War, a sharecropping system of
agricultural production arose as a replacement to enslaved labor. This system shed some of the
destructive tendencies of the previous era, but it further entrenched extractive industries and lowwage labor markets. Mississippi took active steps to industrialize in the early 20th century, but
industrialization was slow to take hold. As more industry began to appear though, many of
harmful legacies of the past hindered the ability of industrialization to bring better lives to all
Mississippians.
This chapter seeks to outline the history of Mississippi’s economic development from its
origins to the modern day. The dominance of the cotton industry in the 19th and early 20th
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centuries encapsulates the story of Mississippi’s early economic history. Then, in 1936,
Mississippi began efforts to industrialize the state through the Balance Agriculture With Industry
program (BAWI). The BAWI program exemplifies the South’s attempt to rapidly industrialize
and usher in waves of economic development, and it serves as the perfect example of how
Mississippi developed to its present form. Recently, Mississippi has added two automobile final
assembly plants to its economy which have served as a nexus for economic growth. Despite
these recent successes, Mississippi’s story does stand out as an exception from the norm in many
ways. As such, this chapter will also briefly discuss why Mississippi’s development differed
from general trends before finally connecting Mississippi to the broader literature.
Cotton - A Despotic King
Antebellum
The Mississippi Delta is among the most fertile farmlands in the United States. Beginning
in the early 1800’s, planters developed an agriculture based economy fueled by enslaved labor
and the production of cotton. As time passed, the incredibly high prices of cotton fueled this
industry to new heights. Planters expanded their plantations’ production, purchasing more land
and demanding more enslaved labor. The behavior of these planters was geared toward the
ownership and control of enslaved labor, effectively acting as “labor-lords” as opposed to
landowners (Wright 1986). The existence and prioritization of enslaved labor during the
antebellum period enabled a stagnation and deterioration in the value of land, lost capital in the
postbellum period, and a low-wage labor market; all of which contributed to the severe
underdevelopment of Mississippi’s modern economy.
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The nature of Cotton production and the inputs involved in it meant that the wealthiest
Mississippians, labor-lords, felt no incentive to invest in developing the land (Wright 1986).
Wright (1986) explains that the primary reason for this is lack of incentive is that these laborlords’ wealth was largely tied to the value of their enslaved laborers. The value of enslaved
laborers often compromised two-thirds of labor-lords’ wealth, and the value of these laborers was
independent of local lands (Wright 1986). Enslaved laborers could easily be moved to new areas
and exchanged whereas land could not. As such, investments in the land, whether they be
mineral exploration, infrastructure projects, or facilities, would not substantially increase the
wealth of labor-lords nor provide them with nearly as much liquidity. This idea is explored by
Wright (1986) through the example of the Piedmont gold rush. Labor-lords heard rumors of gold
being found near them, but they expressed little interest and did not search for gold. Searching
for gold with enslaved labor carried the opportunity cost of agricultural production. Additionally,
the discovery of gold deposits would only increase the value of their land. This increase in value
of the land did little to improve the wealth of the landowner/ labor-lord, and the selling of the
land for gold mines would actively hinder the ability to continue agricultural production. The
result is that in the South, wealth necessitated the accumulation of enslaved laborers, and land
and communities were distinctly secondary (Wright 1986).
Additionally, the nature of enslaved labor investments tended to disperse populations and
prevent infrastructure from being developed. Whereas populations were condensed to cities in
free-states, populations in the South tended to be isolated to plantations, and small towns were
the main developments (Wright 1986). Labor-lords were actively separate from these
communities, and they had little stake in assuring their success (Wright 1986). Wright (1986)
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illuminates this by showing that Mississippi had only 29 towns with a population over 200 in
1853 while Indiana had over 77 towns of that size in 1833. By 1847, Indiana had 156 towns with
a population over 200 while still having a smaller population than Mississippi in 1853. This
dispersal of populations, combined with the lack of incentive to invest in developments, fueled a
cycle where more industries would continually face hurdles to develop.
There are additional economic reasons for why capital was so heavily consolidated into
cotton production. Cotton sold for high prices, and there were low barriers to expanding
production. Though manufacturing fetched higher returns than most agricultural investments,
cotton could be produced with a mix of land, enslaved labor, and a cotton gin. Afterwards, cotton
could be shipped to market through readily available natural waterways (Fogel 1979). On the
other hand, other industries needed greater investments or even infrastructure which was
nonexistent. This meant that investing capital elsewhere carried a high opportunity cost (lost
profits from cotton production).
Another confounding factor which hindered the South's (and Mississippi’s) ability to
develop is that all of the capital invested into the use of enslaved labor was unable to be
reabsorbed into other sectors of the economy (Wright 1986). Mississippi’s economy not only
relied upon the use of enslaved labor, enslaved people themselves were often used as collateral in
credit transactions. The value of enslaved laborers were often used to back securities in banks
throughout the United States (Beckert 2014). Labor-lords in Mississippi relied upon these
securities to finance expansion. The abolition of slavery not only erased all of the capital that had
been invested into enslaved labor, it also directly cut off a critical pipeline of credit which could
have financed the development of other industries.
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Postbellum
These preconditions from the antebellum era explain some of the reasons that Mississippi
struggled to develop in the 20th century, but the existence of a low-wage labor market within a
high wage country plays the most prominent role. Following the abolition of slavery,
sharecropping became the dominant form of agricultural production of cotton. This
sharecropping system promoted an almost exclusively race based hierarchy where Black laborers
were often entrapped with debt by White landlords. The use of this system reversed some of the
hinderances to development from the antebellum era, but it also entrenched low-wages and a
continual deprival of resources to maintain it.
As slavery was abolished, former labor-lords transitioned into landlords ruling over
sharecroppers. As such, these plantation owners began to invest in new industries for the first
time (Wright 1986). These investments primarily fell into two categories - industries which
generated more value out of cotton production and extractive industries. Industries such as
fertilizer plants, cotton gins, and cotton-goods manufacturing enabled greater profit margins for
plantation owners, either by boosting output or by increasing value of products before exporting.
As for the extractive industries, the lumber industry dominated in Mississippi while other regions
developed coal and iron industries. These industries increased the value of the land, a stark
contrast from the antebellum era, but these industries often did little to add value to the natural
resource being extracted (Prince 1961).
Though the new industries were an improvement from the antebellum era, the active
decision to maintain a low-wage labor supply hindered future economic development. Because
sharecropping replaced enslaved laborers, sharecropping landlords demanded a labor force with
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enough low-wage workers. In order to maintain an adequate supply of low-wage labor that could
continually be utilized, the Mississippi Delta was kept underdeveloped and attempts to improve
education were halted (Wright 1986). Political leaders feared that improved educational
opportunities would negatively impact the low-wage labor supply in Mississippi. Leaders
primarily feared that highly educated resident would migrate out of the state, but they also feared
that educational opportunities would enabled a more skilled workforce that could not be utilized
for agricultural production (Wright 1986). This failure to educate maintained the low-wage labor
supply necessary for sharecropping, but it also contributed to the lack of technological
innovation occurring within the South (Wright 1986).
Mississippi’s entanglement with agriculture and cotton production played a profound role
in shaping the economic development of the state. Cotton production’s demand for enslaved
labor dealt a tremendous toll on the ability of the state to develop in the antebellum period, and
the legacies of that regrettable institution delayed development in the postbellum period. Shifting
beyond the legacies of Slavery to the formation of the modern economy, it is evident that
Mississippi’s insistence on preserving the cotton industry enshrined a system that protected lowwage labor and neutered the ability to develop the state’s economy.
Balance Agriculture With Industry and Industrialization in Mississippi
At the dawn of the 20th century, Mississippi remained a heavily agrarian society in a
rapidly industrializing nation. The few industries that did exist in the state added little value to
the raw resources that were being harvested there (Prince 1961). Additionally, the dominance of
cotton meant that the well being of the state’s economy fluctuated with cotton prices (Prince
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1961). As such, Mississippi saw decades of emigration, losing roughly 400,000 people in the
1930’s and similar rates in the 1940’s and 1950’s (Prince 1961).
Recognizing this precarious position, Mississippi enacted Balance Agriculture with
Industry Program (BAWI) in 1936. This program enabled municipalities and counties to
purchase land, build facilities, and rent out facilities in order to foster the economic growth and
attract manufacturers (Freedman 2017). These facilities were built with public funds as a direct
public subsidy and rented or sold to individuals or corporations that promised to locate industrial
plants within those facilities. Additionally, corporations who participate in BAWI receive a fiveyear tax exemption from the state, and the cost of rent becomes a deductible for federal and state
corporation income taxes (Prince 1961). Because of its method and level of comprehensiveness,
BAWI stands out as a truly unique state industrial development.
As part of this program, Mississippi established the Industrial Commission and the
Advertising Commission (Prince 1961). The advertising commission severed as a promotion
agency for the state and the BAWI program. This commission advertised the benefits of locating
industry in Mississippi and the existence of the BAWI program as an added incentive on the
national level, even directly targeting particular industrialists (Prince 1961). By 1939,
approximately 370 serious industrial inquiries about the BAWI program were handed over to the
Industrial Commission from the Advertising Commission. During this time, only 10 firms,
employing 4,000 workers, had been established in Mississippi under the BAWI program (Prince
1961).
Though this result raises doubts about the effectiveness of the program and/or the work of
the advertising commission, both of these programs did perform valuable functions. Part of the
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reason so few firms were seriously considered and actually implemented is that the commission
may have been too careful in its screening of prospective firms; however, this screening at the
state level served an important function as it offered protections to local governments (Hopkins
1944).
The BAWI program was allowed to lapse under Governor Johnson in 1940, but it was
reinstated in 1944 under Governor Bailey. This reinstated program was largely the same expect
the advertising and industrial commission were now united under the Advertising and Industrial
Board (A&I board) (Prince 1961). The new A&I board was able to cover more ground under
Governor Bailey and began personally soliciting industrialists and forming an ad campaign
designed to attract tourism.
On the whole, the program did serve to help the state “balance” agriculture with industry,
but BAWI likely did little to attract large industrial investments. By 1954, the value added by
manufactures in Mississippi reached $389 million, just $11 million short of the value of all farm
crops produced in the state that year (and a $317 million improvement over 1939 numbers). The
vast majority of these manufacturers fell into two, sometimes overlapping categories. Firms were
either “footloose” industries, meaning they have no definitive location requirements (I.e.
garments, textiles, and shoe industries) or they were more domestic driven firms (I.e. firms
founded by someone in the region to interact with a region’s industry). Though these industries
locate primarily based on low-wage scales, the offering of the BAWI subsidies helped drive these
firms to locate in Mississippi as opposed to other southern states with low wages (Prince 1961).
In 1965, industrial employment was greater than agricultural employment for the first
time in Mississippi’s history (Burrus and Sansing, n.d.). The largest industries responsible for
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this shift were the saw mills, wood products, furniture, and textiles. The textile industry alone
accounted for 22% of the state’s total employment in 1965 (Lester 2017). However, it must be
noted that this industrialization came at a cost. Due to its unique structure, municipalities and
counties were often left with the bill from BAWI facilities if firms did not stay approximately 20
years and pay off the mortgage through their rent. The fact that the majority of these firms were
“footloose” industries meant that communities could experience disaster if these industries
decided to move elsewhere.
That disaster came as these industries began to be outsourced in the 80’s and 90’s.
Following new regulations which expanded free trade, footloose industries such as the textile and
furniture industry were able to relocate from Mississippi to countries with lower labor costs. The
absence of these industries left many communities in dire straits.
The state of Mississippi had several responses to these departures. For one, Mississippi
passed the Mississippi Gaming Control Act in 1990 in order to allow Casinos to operate along
the Mississippi River. Legislators hoped that these casinos would serve as a revenue advantage
for the state and these regions along the river (Brumback 2021). More importantly though,
Mississippi began to emphasize industrial clusters in their economic development strategies
(Miller 2017). Economic developers hoped that these industrial clusters would be incorporate
mixes of region industries with suppliers, consumers, technology, and large firms in order to
provide higher wages and more stability to a region.
Automobiles and Today
Today, Mississippi’s economy is largely manufacturing and service based, with only a
small share of the state’s gross product being agricultural products (Burrus and Sansing, n.d.).
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Among the largest and most stable manufacturing jobs in Mississippi are the jobs related to
automobile final assembly plants. The presence of automobile manufacturers has had a profound
effect on the economic development of the state, and the story of bringing automobile
manufacturers to Mississippi highlights important lessons that were learned from the BAWI
program.
The automobile industry first came to Mississippi in a substantial way in the early 2000’s
as final assembly plants began to be built. As manufacturing as a whole began to decline in
Mississippi at the end of the 20th century, Mississippi began to target new industries to fill the
void left behind by these exiting firms. The automobile industry was one of the few industries
that wasn’t being outsourced, and it was one of the even fewer that was growing (Miller 2017).
As such, State and Municipal level officials made it priority to target this industry, and the
emphasis on creating industrial clusters justified the use of publicly funded incentive packages
and strategies.
Mississippi targeted the automobile industry aggressively starting in the early 2000’s. The
state’s approach built off of BAWI’s example, but it also tried new approaches. States and
municipalities optioned land for the purposes of creating industrial sites large enough to house
automobile plants. Often, state level officials such as the governor themselves contacted CEO’s
directly and formed personal relationships. The state also did advertising campaigns meant to
bolster the image of the state in the eyes of automobile CEO’s. All of these methods aligned with
had been done under BAWI, but they were greatly expanded in the pursuit of automobile
assembly plants.

!28
In addition to expanding upon what had already been tried, the state also provided new
assistance that was directly important to the automobile industry. Since automobile assembly
plants are quite large and require extensive materials, they required numerous permits in order to
be built. Mississippi actively expedited the process of obtaining these permits for these firms.
Automobile firms also typically require access to rail in order to ship final products to end
markets throughout the country. As such, Mississippi actively negotiated with railroad companies
on behalf of the firm to ensure passage could be obtained. Once firms began to locate within
Mississippi, local manufacturers became suppliers. Additionally, new firms emerged to meet the
needs of these final assembly plants. Economic developers at the state and municipal level
facilitated the creation of these suppliers in order to ensure the automobile manufacturer could
operate at max capacity.
Distinctions from the Norm of Development
Mississippi’s economy did transform and become more inline with the national average
throughout this history, but there are still important factors that distinguish Mississippi from the
rest of the United States. First, for a long time, the presence of these industries was largely
predicated upon either the extraction of natural resources, the proximity to natural resources, or
the use of cheap labor. Second, and perhaps most concerning, the economic development that
occurred within the state did little to change to social make-up of the state. On the whole, the
race based hierarchy that the South had created and perpetuated for generations had remained
intact.
These conditions raise the question of how Mississippi’s development took this shape.
After all, many economist believe that spot-markets for labor should completely erase
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distinctions of race. Wright (1986) repeats this sentiment, and he even goes so far as to confirm
that this was the case. In addition to this, empirical evidence from other nations suggest that
Mississippi’s history of sharecropping work should have meant that Mississippians would thrive
under entrepreneurial work from outsourcing (Piore and Sabel 1984). However, these did not
occur. In places where there were more sustained relationships about labor, discrimination was
still the norm (Wright 1986). Mississippians also did not develop a flourishing entrepreneurial or
free-lance sector like other nations with similar preconditions.
An explanation for this peculiar departure from the norm is given in James Cobb’s The
Selling of the South (1982). James Cobb (1982) theorizes that this development occurred in such
a way due to the pre-existing power structures of Mississippi. Ardent supporters of
industrialization in the early stages of Mississippi’s industrial development pushed industries
which added little value to the agricultural and lumber related products that were harvested
nearby instead of advocating for high-wage, technological development (Lester 2017). The
consensus formed around these industries because they preserved the hierarchical, racial society
of the South. These industries not only fell in line with the South’s tradition of low-wage, nonunionized labor, they managed to further enrich white landowners and capitalists without shaking
the rigid hierarchy through higher wages to workers (Cobb 1982). As such, Black Southerners
were either excluded entirely from employment or employed into industries with low wages and
no room for advancement. These industries and their hierarchal nature also didn’t allow for
entrepreneurial and free-lance work which could have thrived.
Cobb (1982) illuminates an important reality of Mississippi’s economy. From a macro
perspective, it seems as though Mississippi’s underdeveloped nature results from its legacy as a
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largely agrarian based economy. However, plenty of former agrarian based economies have
advanced beyond that state and brought in higher-wage jobs. Cobb (1982) shows that
Mississippi’s development was hindered by its deeply segregated society and its unwillingness to
to break from its traditional economic and racial hierarchies. As a result, though Mississippi’s
economy did improve during this period, it did so within these confines and lagged behind the
rest of the region and the nation (Burrus and Sansing, n.d.). This legacy remains with Mississippi
as it is still one of the most economically disadvantaged states with one of the lowest per capita
gross products (Burrus and Sansing, n.d.).
Mississippi Economic History through the lens of Dependency Theory and GVC theory
This brief summary of Mississippi’s economic history highlights a few important
elements of the previously discussed theories of development. The two most evident theories of
development are Dependency Theory and Global Value Chain theory. Through the lens of these
theories, we can gather important insights about why Mississippi’s development was delayed and
why industrialization took the shape that it did.
By looking at this brief history through Dependency theory, we can see that Mississippi
was actively kept in a state of dependence by those with capital throughout many eras. In the
antebellum era, labor-lords actively kept Mississippi underdeveloped by investing in the
accumulation of enslaved persons. This investment prevented the development of infrastructure
and other industries while fueling an extractive industry. Following the civil war, labor-lords
transitioned to land lords, and entrenched extractive industries. The industries which did develop
served to only further enrich the land lords and add a small value to the raw materials which
were extracted. This held true even as Mississippi began to industrialize more heavily.
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This picture aligns with the nature of dependence described by Dependency Theory.
Those who could shape economic development in Mississippi (the periphery) faced active
incentives to maintain industries which extracted raw materials and surplus labor value from the
region from economic forces in the centre. Planters stood to benefit the most by producing cotton
with very low-wage agricultural labor. This active incentive served to keep low wages
throughout the region, entrench extractive industries, and deprive the region of infrastructure. All
of these conditions perpetuated underdevelopment in Mississippi.
Dependency theory provides a compelling narrative of the Mississippi economy in its
early stages, but it loses relevance as we approach the modern day. It is difficult to account for
the rise of the automotive industry within Mississippi and other Southern states through the lens
of Dependency theory. The automobile industry is technologically advanced, provides highpaying jobs, and upgrades its economic functions frequently (Pavlínek 2009). Because of the
automobile’s ability to take on more high value and technologically advanced operations, the
presence of this industry should break down the strict distinctions of centre and periphery that
Dependency theory revolves around. One explanation may be that Mississippi and other
Southern States have successfully assimilated with the economic centre or transitioned to the
semi-periphery, but this comes at odds to Dependency theory though because transition is
supposed to be steeped in conflict. This does not seem to be the case though as it appears that the
economic centre welcomes these activities.
By looking at this brief history through Global Value Chain theory, we can see that
Mississippi’s underdevelopment was partly due to its inability to engage in economic upgrading
in their value chains. In both the antebellum and postbellum eras, the cotton industry was
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extremely important to global trade, and the cotton produced in Mississippi was used in textile
mills in the US Northeast and the United Kingdom. Planters did little to increase the value of
their product in the antebellum era; they simply harvested and ginned cotton before selling it. All
of the actual upgrading of the product (turning the cotton into cloth or finished products)
occurred elsewhere. In the postbellum period, Mississippi improved how much they engaged in
value added manufacturing and expanded to new industries. Though not entirely responsible,
some of this shift was facilitated by state level incentives to increase the presence of industry
within the state. This increase of economic upgrading by manufacturers had a profoundly
positive effect on economic development within the state.
Global Value Chain theory is much better suited to account for the rise of the automobile
industry and explain its impacts than Dependency theory is. Rather than viewing Mississippi as a
low-wage region which provided surplus labor value to the economic centre, Global Value Chain
theory is able to recognize the nuances of Mississippi’s situation. Mississippi’s lower wages and
lack of unions is particularly suitable to firms with labor intensive products that need to be close
to end markets. Additionally, by the end of the 20th century, Mississippi experienced enough
development to be able to provide enough suppliers to automobile plants if they choose to locate.
Overtime, these automobile plants that did locate and the firms that supplied them took on
additional tasks. These additional tasks lower the costs of the production while also adding more
value at the state level.
The next chapter will discuss the examples of the Nissan Automobile Final Assembly
plant in Canton, MS and the Toyota Automobile Final Assembly Plant in Blue Springs, MS.
Through conversations with economic developers who worked on these projects, I elaborate on
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many of the key observations of the automobile industry that GVC literature highlights. Most
importantly, Mississippi’s example shows the interworkings of the automotive’s industry ability
to influence downstream economic development by driving the location of important suppliers.
In addition to confirming this finding, the next chapter also highlights the role of state subsidies
and government officials in attracting lead firms and suppliers.
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Chapter 3: The Automobile Industry in Mississippi
Introduction
As previously mentioned, the automobile industry marks a significant shift in
Mississippi’s economic history. Mississippi shifted its strategies for development to focus on
industrial clusters in the 1990’s, and automobile firms have been vital in establishing successful
automobile clusters. This chapter outlines how Mississippi’s economic development was
impacted by these firms and how the state played a role in their recruitment through interviews
with economic developers. This chapter will also analyze how the findings from these interviews
align with previous GVC literature about the automobile industry. Additionally, this chapter
highlights new contributions about the role of state officials and incentive packages in attracting
lead firms and suppliers.
As GVC literature points out, automobile firms are sensitive to labor costs, prone to
remaining in areas for long periods due to massive capital investments, and capable of driving
the colocation of suppliers (Gereffi et. Al 2008, Pavlínek 2009 ). Policy makers and economic
developers were well aware of these facts, and when foreign automobile firms like Nissan,
Hyundai, Toyota, Mazda, and etc. began looking to open factories in the United States, many
southern states heavily pursued these firms. For Mississippi, these firms were the perfect fit for
their industrial cluster strategy.
Mississippi was fortunate enough to secure two final assembly plants in the 2000’s Nissan in Canton, MS and Toyota in Blue Springs, MS. Though one may assume that these firms
were recruited in a similar manner, the respective stories of each recruitment differ widely. Both
recruitment projects had the full support of the State behind them, but the Toyota recruitment for
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Blue Springs also has significant local element as well. The differences in size of these firms also
illuminates how these firms are able to drive long term economic development.
Nissan in Canton - Improving Sites and Providing Incentives
Beginning in 2000, Mississippi’s Governor Ronnie Musgrove led efforts to recruit an
automobile manufacturer to the state. Nissan North America had announced that they would be
opening a plant in the United States, and many Southern states stood out as good candidates.
Nissan looked to these states because of the nature of their business. The final assembly of
automobiles requires large amounts of labor, and the final product must be shipped by rail to end
markets no matter where it is produced from. As such, Southern states, with their lower wage and
largely non-unionized economies, were the ideal candidates for automobile manufacturers like
Nissan.
In Mississippi, the State Government helped identify a few “super-sites” which could
meet Nissan’s needs. These “super-sites” were typically 1000-1200 contiguous acres with rail
and interstate access. After some consideration, Nissan and their site selection consultants
narrowed their sights on the Canton site because of its proximity to the largest population centers
in the state. State level economic developers then set out to make the Canton site as valuable of a
site as it could be. Through an interview conducted with William Scaggs, an economic developer
who worked on the Canton project, this study highlights that these attempts to increase the value
of the Canton site took three distinct shapes - negotiating the use of rails, expediting permits
required for construction, and mitigating financial risks in the future.
Because automobiles are quite large final products, shipping them to end markets can
only feasibly occur through rail or through trucking. Considering the sheer output of final
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assembly plants and the necessity to ship cars throughout the entire United States, rails are the
only viable option for shipment. The Canton site had access to rail, but it was served by a NorthSouth line owned by Canadian National (CN). This North-South line was the only line that
Canadian National operates in the United States, so Nissan would not have access to the majority
of US markets without going through other rail companies. Recognizing the site would be
worthless without the ability to ship the final product to end markets, the Mississippi
Development Authority began to work a deal between Canadian National and Kansas City
Southern (KCS), another rail company that operated an East-West line in nearby Jackson, MS.

So, my job was to deliver the message from [Mississippi Development Authority] and the
Governor to Mike Haggerty (CEO of KCS) saying “Hey, we want to work a deal to get
KCS to the table with CN to create some trackage rights for that section of rail between
Canton and Jackson. [We would relay that message] via Gil Carmichael (a former Federal
Railway Administration official) because Gil Carmichael had a personal relationship with
Mike Haggerty … In the end, a deal was struck … CN maintained their trackage rights,
but they allowed KCS some limited access to the Canton area. - William Scaggs

These negotiations were conducted between two private railroad companies, but they were
initiated and facilitated by the State of Mississippi. Eventually, a deal was reached, and Nissan
had Mississippi’s assurance that vehicles produced in Canton could reach their end markets
throughout the country.
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The sheer size of Nissan’s investment also meant that any and all ways to decrease
opportunity costs were amazing selling points. By being able to start and finish construction
sooner, Nissan could begin to recoup their investment and become profitable sooner. Mississippi
facilitated this by expediting the permitting process required for a project like this.

There’s a number of permits that, in terms of how long it takes to be permitted, may
range anywhere from six weeks to six months… All of them were done, I think, in three
or four months, and Nissan was extremely pleased with the way the state handled their
permitting process. Then, that became a selling point for Mississippi. [Mississippi] could
use the Nissan Permitting process as a case study to showcase to other companies … that
[says] “Hey, Mississippi can help you get to market faster.” - William Scaggs

In addition to the normal permitting process, the Canton site also presented additional challenges
because there were ponds that posed major environmental concerns. Mississippi’s Department of
Environmental Quality was able to help expedite environmental permits for the CantonsSite,
including the extreme environmental challenge of the ponds. These efforts meant that Nissan
viewed Canton’s facility much more favorably as they could avoid some of the more costly
aspects of environmental permits and begin production sooner.
Finally, Mississippi provided both a generous incentive package and insurance for large
risks. In 2000, the state enacted $295 million in incentives for Nissan. The most prominent line
items in this stimulus package are $80 million to offset training costs, $68 million for site
preparation, $59 million for road improvements, $33 million for water and sewer infrastructure,
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and $17 million for construction of a vehicle preparation building (Lyne 2002). Then, in 2002,
Nissan negotiated with the state to expand their factory, so the state of Mississippi passed
additional incentives totaling $68 million, all before Nissan even finished construction (lyne
2002). These new incentives were for additional training, infrastructure, site preparation, and the
vehicle preparation structure. Outside of direct payments from the state, Mississippi also allowed
generous tax breaks and provided insurance on the building due to the soil. These tax incentives
removed property taxes on the building, removed sales taxes on construction, and provided tax
credits for each worker for 20 years. The insurance provided by the state was that site preparation
would prevent any structural concerns on the factory for 10 years. If there were structural
concerns that arose due to soil shifts, the state would pay for repairs to the facility. These efforts
actively lowered costs for Nissan, mitigated potential costs in the future, and enabled more
profitable production from the beginning.
In 2003, Nissan opened it doors, and by 2004, the plant was directly employing 4,261
workers and contracting out 1,466 temporary workers from multiple temp agencies. Initially, the
plant produced the Nissan Altima, but overtime, more models were added. Then, in 2010, Nissan
completed the addition of a $118 million commercial vehicle line. Today, Nissan is capable of
producing 450,000 vehicles annually, ranging from sedans, SUV’s, trucks, and cargo vans.
Nissan’s production in Mississippi necessitated the construction of multiple suppliers in
the immediate vicinity. Before Nissan even finished construction of their plant, 9 major suppliers
announced that they would be building new factories to supply the Nissan final assembly plant.
Three of these firms located their new plants adjacent to the Nissan plant, and four other firms
placed their new plants within a 2 mile radius of the Canton plant. In 2013, Nissan North
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America helped create another 1 million square foot campus for more suppliers to locate near the
assembly plant (Bowman 2013). The clustering of these suppliers was because Nissan was
utilizing modular production. Modular production outsources the production of automobile parts
to suppliers. This enables the final assembly plant to save on inventory costs and focus on
production and design. These suppliers must locate close to the final assembly plant due to the
nature of the modular production.

The way automotive manufacturing works is it’s “Just In Time” production. That means
that Nissan doesn’t want to warehouse a bunch of parts that they’re going to use for their
assembly line. They want the trucks rolling in and [parts] going from the truck to the line
to be put on the car … And then, it got to the point where Nissan wanted it to be not only
“Just In Time”, they wanted it to be sequenced. They wanted the truck loaded in the
sequence that they were going to be using the parts. That’s how managed the system was
… [ in order to do Just in Time and sequenced, they] need to be pretty close, and that
drove the need for most tier one suppliers to be within a 45 minute radius. - William
Scaggs, economic developer

This was well known by policy makers in Mississippi, and automobile final assembly plants
actively created the industrial clusters that economic developers were seeking.
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The effects that this modular, “just in time” production has on suppliers also explain why
Mississippi was so eager to facilitate expansions in the production capacity of the plant. The
more vehicles that Nissan produced means that more suppliers are likely to locate near Nissan.

At some point, the [Original Equipment Manufacturer] has to get to a threshold of so
many units before its feasible for a supplier to locate … If they can increase the number
of units, then that creates an environment for suppliers to say, “hey, there’s enough
business down here for us to make the local investment and reap more reward than
remaining where we are and having to pay for all these transportation costs.” - William
Scaggs

Mississippi’s policy makers anticipated that Nissan’s presence would fuel downstream economic
development. Nissan’s expansion over the years hints that this is true. Following Nissan’s
decision to produce commercial vehicles in 2010, Nissan quickly opened a supplier park to allow
more suppliers to locate closer to the plant just three years later.
State officials initially estimated that as many as 16,212 spin-off jobs could be created by
2005 (Cardamone 2017). Between 2002 and 2005, total employment increased by 12,432 jobs in
Madison County alone (where Canton is located). The nearly 4000 jobs shortfall could be due to
other plants locating outside of Madison county, a possibility which is exceedingly likely for tier
2 and 3 suppliers.
These jobs were also significantly higher paying than other manufacturing jobs which
had existed beforehand. According to a thesis study by Cayla Cardamone (2017), the average
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annual salary in 2001 of all workers in Madison County and manufacturing workers in Madison
county were practically identical at $26,802 and $26,188, respectively. When the plant opened in
2003, the average annual salary for all workers in Madison county rose by $2,423 to $29,225 a
year, and the average annual salary for manufacturing workers rose by $8,334 to $34,522 a year.
As we approach today, the impact of the Nissan Plant on wages is even more pronounced. In
2015, the average annual salary in Madison county was $42,398, and the average annual salary
for manufacturing workers in Madison county was $56,587.
According to the same study by Cardamone (2017), these wage increases from 2003 to
2015 were 13.99% higher than nearby Rankin County’s increases for all workers during the same
time, and 24.92% higher than nearby Rankin County’s manufacturing wage increases during the
same time. It must be noted that this data is on the aggregate county level. This means that
average salaries account for employees hired by Nissan, employees hired by suppliers, and
temporary workers, but it only accounts for workers who live in Madison County.
Toyota in Blue Springs - The Role of Local and State Governments
This section highlights the work done on the local level to attract automobile
manufacturers to Blue Springs, MS. This work was done by local economic developers long
before the State of Mississippi began to assist in the project. Many of the actions performed by
these local economic developers mirror actions done at the state level in Nissan’s case, especially
when it comes to increasing the value of the site. This section also illuminates the role of state
and local officials in actively forming personal relationships with high ranking business officials
within an automobile firm and how those shape firm’s decisions.
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The story of Toyota’s Final assembly plant in Blue Springs, MS is much different than
the story of Nissan’s plant in Canton, MS. In the Canton example, the story starts with the state
actively pursing Nissan’s investment. Then, Nissan narrowed their eyes on the Canton site
through external consultants they hired. In the Blue Springs case, local economic developers
began to develop a strategy to attract an automobile manufacturer at the local level years before a
project was announced. Much like the Nissan-Canton example, these strategies attempted to
improve the value of the site and target sectors important to the automobile industry. Once
Toyota began to search for sites to build their factories, the economic developers in charge of the
Blue Springs site cooperated with the state of Mississippi to advertise their site, and Toyota
narrowed their sights on the Blue Springs site through their own internal site selection
consultants. Once this occurred, the state of Mississippi and local governments worked in unison
to actively recruit Toyota through Toyota’s internal upper level management.
Before 2000, economic development foundations based in Lee County actively began to
prepare their community to recruit an automobile manufacturer.

In 2000, Tupelo was losing manufacturing plants because we were heavily into furniture.
Over 50% of our population worked in furniture and … we were outsourcing everything
in China for production. [As a result,] just about monthly we would have a plant closing
announcement, so our public officials quickly said, “well, what are we going to do about
this?” The normal process of economic development of what I would call “hitting
singles to score runs" had to go out the window. You had to take a big swipe, so our staff
started doing some research on what were the industries that grew from 1990 to 2000.
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[There was] only 2 industries manufacturing wise … food and food processing and
automotive. [Our] choice was dictated to [us] based on economics. We didn't have a lot of
water. We have to pipe our water in from the Tim Tom [river], so food and food
processing wasn’t an opportunity [we could only pursue Automotive]. - David
Rumbarger

Much like policy makers in the Nissan-Canton case, these economic developers knew that
automobile manufacturers were beginning to establish final assembly plants inside of the United
States, particularly the Southern United States. They were also innately aware of the
automobile’s ability to drive the co-location of suppliers. Because of the manufacturing
downturn the region was experiencing, these conditions drove these economic developers to
begin pursuing an automobile manufacturer without the assistance of the state.
These local level economic developers understood the challenges that their region posed,
so they quickly began to identify a site so they could improve the value of it as quickly as
possible. With help from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), they identified a site in that was
in the adjacent Union County. Economic developers in Lee County quickly earned the
cooperation of officials in Union County to develop the site. With a site identified and an alliance
formed, the first hurdle that they faced was that the region, and particularly the site in Blue
Springs, did not have interstate access.

Our first job as a whole alliance was to go to Washington and get our good friend Senator
Roger Wicker, and Senator Lott at the time, to designate Highway 78 [as an interstate].
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[Wicker] got legislation in the house [which passed to] the Senate and [designated] a
corridor X as Interstate 22 … That was in 2002, and we were off after that. - David
Rumbarger

Local level economic developers indicated that they pushed for this to happen simply because an
automobile final assembly plant had never been located on a non-interstate before. However, the
explanation for why this was such a vital step goes much deeper. Interstate access is vital to these
automobile firms for multiple reasons.

[Automobile manufacturers] are trying to cut down on trucking costs, so they get as close
to the Interstate as possible. Some companies like the visibility as well. They want to be
there. They want their corporate name out there. They want to be seen. - William Scaggs

Because these final assembly plants utilized Just-In-Time, modular production, they require daily
shipments from their suppliers by trucks. Interstates facilitate those shipments and decrease
shipping times and shipping costs. Interstates also provide visibility to the public, an important
factor for most companies, but a vital factor for automobile manufacturers. Previous GVC
literature highlights that this is because the size and costs of their product spark backlash if they
are not produced domestically.
Following the re-designation of Highway 78 as Interstate 22, the Blue Springs site was
briefly considered as a possible site by Toyota in 2003.
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Toyota actually came through later in 2003. The same site engineer that we interacted
with later visited in 2003, and we put him in a helicopter and looked over the site we had
identified … He sat us down after that and spent the next hour explaining why our site
was going to be cut. [That plant went to San Antonio, TX, but] I used that [conversation]
as a template … to say “Hey, we need to begin” - David Rumbarger

This visit legitimized the Blue Springs site as a potential contender for future automobile plants,
and it provided local level economic developers with the groundwork for what sorts of work
needed to be done in order to further improve the value of their site. In particular, site engineers
from Toyota expressed the need for information regarding soil content, information regarding the
topography of the site, an extensive history of the site, and whether there were any other
ownership claims for oil or minerals.
Local economic developers soon found this information, and they began to develop the
site in order to fit the needs of an automobile manufacturer.

We did all phase one for all 1500 acres of the site, and we found a couple phase two
issues that we dealt with at that point in time too. We cleaned that up before Toyota ever
came … We had 12 acres of core engineer wetlands that we had already submitted a
mitigation plan for. - David Rumbarger

I had actually flown to Texas and met with Norfolk Southern, which is [the rail operator
on] the north side of that site, and gotten an over carry agreement. [The rail] was on the
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north side of the interstate, so we also had to bring the railroad over the interstate to the
site as well. - David Rumbarger

Local economic developers did many of the tasks that the state had facilitated for Nissan a few
years prior. As the site became more developed, the value of the site increased in the eyes of
companies because there was less uncertainty, less opportunity costs, and less direct costs that
they would have to bear.
More importantly though, the local economic developers had begun to form a working
relationship with an automobile firm. In 2004, Governor Hailey Barbour took office and
prioritized bringing another automobile manufacturer to the state. Governor Barbour also began
to directly form relationships with the leaders of automobile firms, and the connections that
economic developers in Lee county had already made proved invaluable.

I think the key is that there was a community that started with a strategy and really had a
relationship with the company…When Governor Barbour took office in 2004, one of his
first objectives was to make sure that we had a relationship with Toyota, Kia, and other
companies that might be having another car plant in North America… From a state
perspective, there was no project, just trying to build relationships … [because we formed
those relationships] when [these firms announced] a project, Mississippi had an inside
tracking to some information about what those projects would look like … The good
news is that, going back to 2003, David and team had really done their homework and put
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together a site …[so] that site became the Premier Site for the state in order to win the
project. - Gray Swoope

Because of the work that had already occurred at the local level to prepare the site and the
relationships that had been formed, the Blue Springs site was a top contender for Toyota’s new
automobile final assembly plant.
These relationships proved to be an extremely important factor for the Blue Springs site.
Northeast Mississippi does not have any major cities with large population bases. As such, there
were concerns about the ability to find an adequate supply of workers for both Toyota’s facility
and needed suppliers. To rectify these concerns, local economic developers relied upon their
relationships with upper managements to show how workforce demands could be met

[Dennis Cueno] ended up coming in March of 2006, and we had some of our high
powered business people [such as] Aubrey Patterson (Bancorp South Chairman), Mickey
Holliman (Chairman of Furniture Brands International), David Cole (Itawamba
Community College President) meet with him … We spent some time at the Cooper Tire
plant, spent some time at the Community College … We had people go through schools.
We had people go through HR. We had people go through sister plants around … [So
many things] just to give them an idea of the work ethic [ and the number of workers we
could provide] - David Rumbarger
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Through showing that the largely rural Northeast Mississippi region had prominent industries, a
history of manufacturers in the region, and a local community college which could prepare its
students to work at the Toyota plant and its suppliers, local economic developers put to rest the
concerns surrounding the region’s workforce capabilities.
However, this alone would not be enough to win Toyota’s approval. Local level economic
developers knew that Toyota and other automobile manufacturers were looking at other sites as
well.

We qualified properly about 8 sites that they had looked at … When you get to that level
of complexity as far as utilities, power, land use, and access to interstates, these sites
really come down to a narrow funnel. - David Rumbarger

Ultimately, the work of the local economic developers had managed to make the Blue Springs
site comparable to other sites throughout the Southeast. Any additional progress toward bringing
an automobile manufacturer to the site needed to be facilitated by state level officials. At that
point, Governor Barbour himself got heavily involved in the process.

[After Governor Barbour heard we were the only site being considered in Mississippi,] he
was all in. It just took Dennis Cueno saying “this is what my choice is” and then
Governor Barbour, literally on a dime, turned around and said “OK, what do we do to
win the project?”. He became the best ally we could have ever had, working back and
forth on so many issues. - David Rumbarger
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Governor Barbour did play an active role. [He wanted] daily updates. He wanted to know
where we were, what was the latest news, if he needed to do anything and so on … In the
week after Christmas, we got a request from Japan to put it all on the table in a proposal
with the documents … Governor Barbour did what he calls his “Matlock Moment” where
we recorded him giving what was basically a closing argument for why they should come
to Mississippi. - Gray Swoope

As the process neared the final stages, final negotiations were conducted almost exclusively by
the Governor and his team. Toyota’s upper management met in Japan, and Toyota USA’s site
selection consultants offered their site recommendations. On February 24th, Toyota alerted
Governor Barbour that they had selected the Blue Springs site as the site for their new
automobile final assembly plant. Then, on the 26th, Governor Barbour and his team briefed the
legislative leadership of Mississippi House and Senate and told them his requests for incentives.
The following day, Toyota USA publicly announced that they would be opening a plant in Blue
Springs, MS, and the Mississippi legislature passed an incentive package.
The incentive package that passed mirrored the incentive package that Mississippi passed
years earlier for Nissan’s plant in Canton, MS. This package included $239.9 million, most of
which would be directed toward site preparation and infrastructure. An important note is that the
Governor also included a $30 Million for top tier suppliers to locate in Mississippi as opposed to
Alabama or Tennessee (Pettus 2007).
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The initial estimates from the state of Mississippi were that Toyota would create 2000
jobs directly and 2000 additional jobs from suppliers when they opened their doors in 2010. This
is largely what occurred for the region. Economic developers were able to work with other
suppliers and use the $30 million in supplier incentives to help those plants establish in Northeast
Mississippi.

There were no suppliers there initially because Toyota used their family of suppliers … If
you look at the [45 minute radius], those suppliers could be locating in Tennessee or
Alabama, so Governor Barbour added $30 million to entice suppliers to locate in
Mississippi close to the plant. - Gray Swoope

We located 10 suppliers [for Toyota]. Of those 10 suppliers, 8 located within the state of
Mississippi… This model for Toyota was for a more rural environment where they
decentralized their supplier network… and those plants ended up being in Pontotoc
County, Itawamba County, Union County, and Lee County … and that’s why an
automobile plant is so important is because it has such tentacles into the community David Rumbarger

Through regional assistance by local economic developers and the $30 million in incentives, 8
suppliers located in different counties around the Toyota plant. These plants created an additional
jobs throughout Mississippi, the bulk of which occurred within the surrounding counties though
others occurred further away alongside interstates. As hinted at by David Rumbarger in his quote
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and by William Scaggs earlier in the chapter, this was the intended outcome of pursing an
automobile manufacturer.
Not only did Toyota and its suppliers add new jobs to a region that was losing jobs, these
new jobs raised the average wage in the region, especially for manufacturing workers. According
to Cayla Cardamone (2017) average wages in Union County, Pontotoc County, and Lee County
were generally lower than the Mississippi average for all workers and manufacturing workers in
specific. The most startlingly increases that occurred after Toyota’s plant opening are for
manufacturing workers. In 2009, the average manufacturing worker’s salary was $29,313 in
Union County. This was well below the State average of $39,568 in 2009. Immediately after the
plant opened in 2010, Union County’s average manufacturing salary increased by 21.58% to
$38,319. Nearby Pontotoc and Lee county’s did not see as pronounced of an increase (4.43% and
0.23% respectively), primarily because they received suppliers who employed less workers and
paid slightly less and they already had much higher averages. The impact of Toyota’s wages are
even more pronounced when you look further down the timeline to 2015. In 2015, Union
County’s average manufacturing worker’s salary was $49,890, a 30.2% increase from when the
plant first opened.
Findings and Discussion
Through coupling interviews with economic developers and recent quantitive research, it
is quite obvious that automobile manufacturers have profound impacts on both the economic
development of regions and on workers. This section will report and summarize the key findings
from these interviews. Then, this section will briefly highlight the aforementioned effects on job
creation and wages that are found by the empirical work of Cayla Cardamone (2017) and use
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those findings to evaluate the effectiveness of pursuing and subsidizing these firms. Throughout
this section, discussion surrounding the findings will revolve around the effect on the
community, how these findings align with previous GVC literature, and how these findings
expand upon GVC literature.
The Automobile Industry’s role in Development Outcomes
Previous GVC literature on the automobile industry highlights that the automobile
industry can be brought to less developed areas, spark waves of economic development to
follow, and stay within those areas for long periods of time. Interviews with economic
developers confirm this to be true. The evidence that stems from interviews with Mississippi
economic developers suggests that many of the findings of previous GVC literature can be found
in Mississippi’s case.
Pavlínek (2009) found that automobile manufacturers moved their final assembly plants
to Central and Eastern European Countries for multiple reasons. Central and Eastern European
countries are still relatively underdeveloped, low-wage economies that are integrated within a
highly affluent political unit (the EU). Furthermore, Pavlínek found that Central and Eastern
European countries’s weak trade unions, flexible labor laws, and government incentives actively
accommodated these automobile Transnational Corporations and provided an adequately skilled
workforce at a low wage. As such, these countries provided an opportunity for automobile
manufacturers to produce their labor intensive products at a much lower cost while still having
access to the affluent markets of Western Europe.
Pavlínek’s findings align with the reality in Mississippi. Local and State level economic
developers in both cases understood that Mississippi’s history of low wage, largely non-
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unionized labor was an attractive feature to automobile manufacturers. This attraction is a
byproduct of the nature of automobile manufacturing. Automobiles are large final products
which must be shipped to final markets via rail no matter where they are produced. Because
automobiles produced within the United States can be shipped anywhere in the United States
without tariffs and customs, firms locate where the other costs of production are the lowest,
making states with low wage, non-unionized labor like Mississippi a target. Additionally,
Mississippi and other southern states were actively providing incentives to these firms, much like
the Central and Eastern European countries that Pavlínek points out.
Gereffi et. al (2008) shows that these automobile manufacturers have profound effects on
the automobile value chain by being regionally produced and driving the co-location of
suppliers. Gereffi et. al (2008) shows that automobile production clusters form close to end
markets for a few reasons. One reason is that these automobile production forms clusters largely
due to operational reasons. Automobile production often utilizes Just-In-Time production. This
need to have parts delivered just in time for production to begin means that suppliers need to be
close to final assembly plant in order to make sure parts arrive in a timely fashion no matter the
circumstances. Another reason that these clusters occur is due to the high complexity of
automobile products. Automobiles require many different components, and components are often
specific to vehicle models and platforms. As such, suppliers generally only supply one consumer
and interaction with that consumer necessitates proximity
Evidence for Gereffi’s claims is present in interviews with local and state economic
developers in Mississippi. All three economic developers interviewed showed that downstream
economic development occurred when they talked about the number of suppliers that built their
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own factories because of Nissan and Toyota’s investment. These interviewees also confirmed
that both Nissan and Toyota use their own family of suppliers who make parts specifically for
their models and platforms. In the Nissan-Canton case, some of these suppliers were adjacent to
the facility in order to expedite delivery and increase communication. Furthermore, William
Scaggs elaborated on how Just-In-Time production was able to drive supplier co-location. The
Just-In-Time component necessitates suppliers be near the factory in order to quickly supply the
factory, sometimes multiple times a day. Additionally, suppliers who may already exist and are
further away face an economic decision to invest in the construction of a new facility closer to a
final assembly plant based on costs and benefits. When a final assembly plant produces a certain
threshold of units, suppliers make less money paying for shipping than they would make if they
simply invested in a plant much closer to the facility. Evidence that this is the case occurred it
2013 when a new industrial park was opened for Nissan Suppliers after Nissan expanded
production to commercial vehicles.
Finally, Gereffi et. al (2008) shows that these plants are likely to be produced near end
markers and long lived before a move ever occurs. Gereffi finds that this static nature is because
of two factors. First, automobile final assembly plants are large plants that require massive
capital investment. These massive capital investment are required to even begin production. As
such, the benefits of moving production elsewhere must be massive in order to justify
abandoning a facility worth billions of dollars and constructing another facility worth billions.
The second reason is that those cluster tend to be regionally produced due to political pressures.
Gereffi et. al (2008) finds that the high costs and visibility of automobiles is capable of
generating backlash among the general population if imported vehicles have too much of a
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market share of the total vehicles purchased. Gereffi et. al (2008) gives the example of Japanese
automakers in the 1980’s. Japan had begun to rapidly export their vehicles across the globe,
taking over a large share of the American market in the process. In response, the United States
set voluntary limits to market-share expansion via exports - a move directly aimed at Japanese
Automobile manufacturers. Japanese automakers then moved to regional production within the
United States. These political pressures for lead firms to locate final assembly plants within the
same region as their final markets also means that suppliers face those same pressures to be
locate regionally and proximate to the final assembly plants.
Evidence that this is the case can be seen when discussing why automobile manufacturers
want to locate along an interstate. Economic developers in the Toyota-Blue Springs case went
through great efforts to designate Highway 78 as Interstate 22. This re-designation did little to
change the actual conditions of the roads near the site; it remained a four-lane road divided by a
median, and the speed limit was only marginally increased from 65 MPH to 70 MPH. As such,
designating the road as an interstate did little to decrease transportation costs. However, this redesignation was important because it connected other highways and allowed for a more direct
interstate between the major cities of Memphis, TN and Birmingham, AL. This more direct
interstate facilitated more traffic between these two major cities, and made Toyota’s investment
in the region far more visible. In his interview, William Scaggs points out that automobile firms
actively wanted this visibility because it advertised that they were making an investment in the
community. That desire to advertise their investment shows that these firms are aware of their
vulnerability to public backlash, and showing that they were invested in the community kept
public support in their favor.
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The Role of State and Local Actors
In addition to aligning with previous GVC literature, this thesis provides a substantial
contribution by outlining the role of State and Local level actors in influencing automotive value
chains. State and local economic developers actively influenced the decision to locate final
assembly plants in Mississippi by improving the value of sites through multiple avenues.
Additionally, state and local level actors also directly interacted with key decision makers inside
automobile firms in order to further meet the needs of these firms and incentivize their
investment within the state.
In the Nissan-Canton example, state level economic developers actively increased the
value of the Canton site by addressing specific needs of the automobile industry. The first need
that was met was the need to transport final products via rail. Mississippi Development Authority
facilitated negotiations between Canadian National and Kansas City Southern in order to secure
trackage rights for a short section of Canadian National’s rail from Canton, MS to Jackson, MS.
These negations were between two railroad companies, but they were facilitated by economic
developers within the Mississippi Development Authority. In doing so, economic developers
were able to improve the value of the Canton site because it ensured that Nissan was able to ship
their cars to final markets. The second need that was met was speed to market. State level
officials expedited the permitting process for Nissan. A construction project as large as Nissan’s
final assembly plant in Canton requires extensive environmental permits, many of which could
take up to six months. Governor Ronnie Musgrove directly communicated with his appointee for
the head of the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality and have all environmental
permits expedited. Nissan was able to receive all necessary permits within three to 4 months.
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This meant that Nissan was able to begin producing and selling vehicles sooner, enabling them to
start profiting off of their investment sooner. Finally, the state actively mitigated other concerns
that Nissan had through a stimulus package and insurance. Infrastructure was improved to handle
the increased use caused by Nissan. The State provided funding for labor training, so Nissan
would have an adequately trained labor force that could begin production when the doors
opened. Insurance provided by the state mitigated the risk of potential damage done to the
facility by shifting soil. Other Incentives directly reduced the costs of construction that Nissan
faced. All of these other incentives and promises made Nissan favor the Canton site over
comparable sites throughout the Southeast.
In the Toyota-Blue Springs case, similar value enhancing actions occurred, except these
actions were carried out by local level economic developers. Local level economic developers
had the Blue Springs site environmentally cleared to pass both phase one and phase two of
environmental permits before an automobile manufacturer seriously considered moving to the
site. Additionally, economic developers had already secured an over carry agreement as well as
plans to connect the railroad to the plant. Once Toyota had confirmed that they would be
establishing a plant in Blue Springs, MS, they received a stimulus package that was similar to the
stimulus package that was passed when Nissan established their plant. All of these actions mirror
the actions that were done by state officials at the Canton site, and they were done to make the
Blue Springs site more valuable in the eyes of automobile manufacturers by removing
uncertainties, direct costs, and opportunity costs.
More importantly though, we see the role that state and local actors play in interacting
with automobile firms in the Toyota-Blue Springs case. Because local economic developers
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formed relationships with decision makers within Toyota, they were actively able to showcase
what their region could offer. Local economic developers were able to take officials in charge of
site selection to local schools, local community college, and local manufacturers in order to show
that Toyota could find an ample supply of skilled workers, even in a region that had no major
population centers. Once the selection process had been narrowed down to the Blue Springs site
and a few other sites throughout the southeast, the Governor of Mississippi himself got directly
involved in the process. By the interviewees’ accounts, Governor Barbour was able to actively
open doors to facilitate the process and served to directly influence senior management of Toyota
by meeting with them on several occasions and sending a video statement explaining why
Mississippi was the best place for them to invest. The interviewee’s stressed that the Governor’s
involvement was critical to the project as it ensured that anything that needed to be done became
a top priority for the entire state and that his assistance served as assurance to Toyota that
Mississippi would fully cooperate with them.
Benefit to Mississippi
Automobile manufacturers appear to be quite beneficial to the communities they locate
in. These automobile manufacturers directly employ 1000’s of workers at wages that are
generally much higher than other jobs when they initially open. These jobs then force other
companies to compete for workers and raise their respective wages, raising wages across all
sectors, especially manufacturing (Cardamone, 2017).
However, whether or not these automobile manufacturers are worth the resources that the
state pours into them is not so certain. Mississippi directly spent $363 million to attract Nissan
and its suppliers to Canton, MS and $293.9 million to attract Toyota and its suppliers to Blue
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Springs, MS. Mississippi also now forgoes much of the tax revenues that they would receive
from these manufacturers. Some estimates put these tax breaks as effectively representing an
additional $1 billion in subsidies for each firm (Good Jobs First 2013). These incentive packages
imposed massive costs on the state of Mississippi, and continued tax breaks in the future may
prolong this debt and increase the cost of each job.
On a theoretical level, these subsidies are only necessary to attract workers when the
workers who move to these new firms become less productive. The economic intuition behind
this is rather simple and can be explained by discussing the economic intuition behind hiring
decisions and how subsidies interact with that decision.
In a competitive market, firms tend to employ workers whose Marginal Product of Labor
(MPL) exceeds their Marginal Cost (MC or Wage). This happens because if adding an additional
worker generates any quantity of benefits more than it costs to employ them, the firm generates
more profit from that worker’s employment. Since the MPL of workers generally diminishes as
more workers are added, the firm hires employees until the MPL of an additional worker is equal
to the wage of that worker (I.e. a workers wage in a competitive labor market is related to their
MPL).
If a firm that would make the worker more productive begins producing within the state,
that worker can earn a higher wage there because their MPL would increase at that new firm.
That worker would then likely move, begin to work for that firm, and earn a higher wage. As
such, there is no need for subsidies if the new firm truly employs workers in more productive
work. Thus, if subsidies that Mississippi provides to Nissan are really necessary, then these new
jobs must actually be less productive.
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Subsidizing less productive work has deleterious effects on society. Suppose that a
worker initially had a MPL of $10/hour at a manufacturing plant in Canton, MS in 2002. That
worker would be providing $10/hour worth of production to society, and that worker would be
receiving $10/hour in wage. If Nissan opens up shop in Canton, MS and that same worker would
have a MPL of $9.50/hour at Nissan, that worker would not switch jobs and work at Nissan
(because their wage would be $0.50/hour less). However, if Nissan receives a subsidy for 10% of
labor costs, it could afford to pay that worker $10.45/ hour ($9.50/hour for their MPL + $0.95
from the 10% subsidy). Now, that worker would move to Nissan and receive $0.45/hour more.
However, society incurs a cost from subsidizing this move to less productive work. The subsidies
itself is simply a transfer from tax payers to that worker, but society now receives $0.50 less in
production because of the move (Original MPL $10.00/hour - New MPL $9.50/hour = $0.50/
hour loss).
This theoretical approach to subsidies highlights two distinct possibilities. One possibility
is that the subsidies provided to Nissan and Toyota were necessary for them to locate their plants
in Mississippi, and workers employed by these firms are now having their wages subsidized to
do less productive work. The other possibility is that these workers are actually more productive
at these new firms, and the subsidies are not needed. If the latter situation is true, then subsidies
are only acting as wealth transfers from Mississippi’s tax payers to Nissan (distributed to
employees, executives, and shareholders). Either situation implies that subsidies result in a net
harm for the state, and the state would be better off not subsidizing the firm.
Branching out from the basic theory of subsidies, we can begin to conduct a basic
analysis of the incentive packages and subsidies that Nissan received in order to apply it to this
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theory. As previously mentioned, from 2000-2002, Mississippi passed 2 stimulus bills that
totaled $363 million in incentives (roads, site preparation, job training, etc.) It’s estimated that
Nissan was also eligible for up to an additional $1 billion in subsidies in Mississippi over 20
years. That means that the total price tag for Nissan coming to Mississippi can be viewed as $1.3
Billion over 20 years. However, if it is possible to separate the initial incentive package (which
provided funding for infrastructure improvements, employee training, and site preparation) from
the subsidies which followed afterwards, then another potential price tag to consider is $363
million.
In order to make sense of these two potential price tags, we need to consider the total
number of jobs that were created from these industries moving to Mississippi. According to
Cayla Cardamone (2017) it appears that the Nissan plant in Canton created 12,432 jobs total
(through all downstream avenues). However, Peavy (2007) looks at the Nissan case and finds
that only 4,062 were “created”, all the other jobs were simply transfers from one industry to
another.
With that in mind, there are four potential scenarios: 1) incentives / 12,432 workers , 2)
incentives / 4,062 workers, 3) incentives + subsidies / 12,432 workers, and 4) incentives +
subsidies / 4,062 workers. The results of these scenarios are -

1) $363,000,000 / 12,432 = $29,108 per worker
2) $363,000,000 / 4,062 = $89,364 per worker
3) $1,300,000,000 / 12,432 = $104,568 per worker
4) $1,300,000,000 / 4,062 = $320,039 per worker
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I believe $29,108 per worker figure from Scenario 1 represents the best case scenario.
Through this lens, Mississippi spent $29,108 per worker to relocate some workers to a new
industry and to create new jobs. This doesn’t seem too costly, especially considering that workers
who transferred likely saw a wage increase and that new jobs that were created saw a new job
with a higher than average wage. However, if you view this incentive package as a subsidy, there
is the question of why these incentives were needed if the workers were engaging in more
productive work.
The inclusion of transfers calls the use of these funds into question because these
transfers may not have really improved their wage by much. As such, the $89,364 per worker
figure from Scenario 2 likely is the best representation of how much we spent on these new jobs.
This means MS spent $89,364 per job that paid roughly $34,552 in 2003 and $56,587 in 2015
(Cardamone 2017). It would take 3 years of all 4,062 workers being employed at the average
manufacturing workers salary before the benefit in wages equalled out to our investment, and
even then we would be lagging behind in actual tax revenue.
If you view the initial $363 million incentive packages passed by Mississippi in 2002 and
2003 as investments in infrastructure and human capital, a potential justification for these funds
arises. The automotive industry may have a certain “lumpiness” to it where decisions to invest
capital and hire workers can only be done in large increments (I.e. you either get a lump sum of
automotive manufacturing jobs or none at all).
This justification of the incentive packages shows theoretical potential. The highly
complex, just-in-time nature of automobile production may suggest that this is true. Automobile
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final assembly plants require many workers to assembly the complex components of cars, and
suppliers must be located nearby in order to meet time constraints. Unfortunately though, this
study cannot speak to how that “lumpiness” affects the firm’s decision and whether the use of
incentive packages serve to justify that use without subsidizing less productive work or acting as
wealth transfers.
However, when you include the tax breaks and subsidies into the price tag for these jobs,
it becomes clear that the state is engaging in societally harming behavior. Scenario 3 puts the
price tag at $104,568 per worker, and Scenario 4 puts the price tag at $320,039 per worker. Even
though these costs are spread out by 20 years, the result is that each job is being subsidized by
$5,228 a year in Scenario 3 and $16,002 a year in Scenario 4. The economic intuition from
subsidies clearly apply here, and the implication is that either these subsidies are needed and the
state is effectively paying workers thousands a year to do less productive work or these subsidies
are not needed and the state is transferring wealth from tax payers to Nissan. The latter
explanation has been advocated in other empirical works on the Automotive industry in
Mississippi, with those authors going so far as to call the practice of subsidizing Toyota and
Nissan “Crony Capitalism” (Garrett and Shughart 2018).
In conclusion, from a strategy perspective, it seems clear that incentives were critical in
the firm’s initial decision to locate to Mississippi. This is because large scale industrial sites are
often highly comparable in the final stages of the selection process, and southern state effectively
engaged in a bidding war. However, whether or not the final amount spent on each firm was
justified is uncertain. Mississippi spent $363 million alone on Nissan’s incentive packages. It is
possible to view these incentive packages as infrastructure and human capital investments that
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when coupled with the “lumpiness” of the automobile industry mean they are worthwhile
investments. On the other hand, the value of giving additional tax breaks beyond the initial
promise is clearly deleterious. Providing subsidies to Nissan and Toyota either subsidize
workers’ wage to do less productive work (harming society in the process) or they simply act as
wealth transfers from tax payers to Nissan and Toyota. Furthermore, the removal of tax breaks
are unlikely to cause firms to move due to the extremely large capital investment that these final
assembly plants are, and firms are unlikely to substantially decrease the number of workers they
employ if tax breaks are removed.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion and Implications for Future Development
Introduction
In this thesis, I set out to study Mississippi - a relatively underdeveloped region within
one of the most developed countries in the world. Within Mississippi, one of the largest drivers
of economic development in recent years has been two automobile final assembly plants. Using
Global Value Chain theory, I investigated the automobile industry in Mississippi in order to
determine how it drives economic development and how that can be replicated in the future for
other industries.
Contribution
Through interviews with economic developers at the State and Local level, I discovered
that the automobile industry in Mississippi is capable of driving economic development due to its
Just-In-Time, modular style of production. I also found that economic developers and policy
makers heavily pursued these manufacturers for two additional reasons. First, areas like
Mississippi were capable of providing an adequately skilled workforce at the lowest possible
price (I.e. Mississippi had the comparative advantage in labor). Second, these plants tended to be
static, due to both massive capital investments and political pressures. All of these findings align
with previous GVC literature on the automobile industry.
This thesis contributes an in depth analysis of the role of state and local actors in
influencing the location of these firms on a subnational level. Previous GVC literature
generalizes the role of governments as providing subsidies or threatening restrictive policies. In
reality, the role of State and local actors is far more complex. State and local actors act as in
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improving the value of sites, advertising their unique benefits, and promising expedited
solutions.
Both the Nissan-Canton and Toyota-Blue Springs cases show that local and state actors
play a massive role in improving the value of sites. In both cases, economic developers took
steps to ensure automobile manufacturers could access their markets through rails, could begin to
ship products to market faster, and any risks about the location mitigated. In the Toyota-Blue
Springs case, we also see the role of local economic developers acting as salesmen. Local
economic developers actively showcased their area to prove that their site was a viable option
despite many factors which had previously been big issues to automobile manufacturers. Finally,
in both cases, we see the important role that governors and other state executives play in the
process by promising expedited solutions. In the Nissan-Canton case, Governor Musgrove’s
appointees for the Mississippi Development Authority and the Mississippi Department of
Environmental Quality expedited permits at the governor’s orders. In the Toyota-Blue Springs
case, Governor Barbour played an active role in contacting every major player and facilitating
work.
Implications for Future Development
The roles these local and state actors play have serious implications for how these actors
can influence economic development in the future. These actors correctly identified elements that
were important in the decision making process of these firms and they acted accordingly. These
actors also targeted an entity that was especially capable of both remaining static and driving the
co-location of suppliers near the firm. By taking note of the lessons these cases provide, policy
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makers and government affiliated actors can further develop Mississippi and secure more
valuable segments of global value chains within the state.
Upcoming Developments - Electric Vehicles
One way that lessons learned from these cases can be utilized is by applying them to
upcoming developments in the automobile industry. Recently, there has been a shift toward
electric vehicle adoption within the United States. Industry giants such as Ford, Chevrolet, and
more importantly, Nissan and Toyota have announced that their companies will be transitioning
to electric vehicles. Many of these companies state that by 2030, most, if not all, of their fleet
will be electric or electric capable (Toohey 2021, Eisenstein 2021). This marks a tremendous
shift in the value chain as these lead firms will now demand new products from their suppliers,
and these new suppliers are opportunities for economic developers.
Electric vehicles utilize electric motors and thus no longer need traditional gasoline
powered engines. It is probable that engine factories owned and operated by Nissan and Toyota
will simply transition to producing electric motors, but it is possible that there will be additional
opportunities to establish electric motor suppliers within Mississippi.
A far more likely opportunity however is the additional, bulky materials that electric
vehicles require. Electric vehicles currently require massive battery packs which span the length
of the car’s cabin. Electric vehicles also require power converters and coolant systems. The
bulkiness and necessity of these components means that they are unlikely to be produced from
far away and then shipped to the final assembly plant. As such , these are new firms (or new
adaptations to suppliers) that Mississippi must facilitate if they want to reap the benefits of these
changes to the value chain.
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These benefits, whether they be from electric motor factories or other suppliers, can be
obtained by following many of the previous actions that economic developers took for Nissan
and Toyota. However, these actions must be catered for the specific needs of the electric
components. Sites are still a large component of the decision to locate for suppliers. Much like
the sites for Nissan and Toyota, sites that already have environmental permitting complete or can
easily be expedited is a major advantage. However, these sites are less likely to require rail
access in order to establish a plant. Incentives will also play a big role in influencing the location
decision of these suppliers. Most importantly though, these new, tier one suppliers will also
require tier two and tier three suppliers. Mississippi must facilitate access to those lower tiers if
they hope to facilitate tier one suppliers. Our laws, strategies, and infrastructure need to be
compatible with the demands of these new suppliers so we can ensure that they are able to
operate within our state.
Outside of locating new suppliers in the state, we also have a tremendous opportunity to
incorporate more valuable segments of the supply chain within Mississippi. Electric vehicles are
a relatively new technology that could potentially incorporate other technologies such as AI
powered autonomous driving systems. These new technologies will have to undergo testing. That
testing will create more research and development jobs, and those jobs could be located with
Nissan’s and Toyota’s final assembly plants in Mississippi. In order to secure this valuable
segment of the value chain and bring those jobs to Mississippi, Mississippi will need to adapt its
laws and regulations to facilitate this testing to occur within the state (I.e. electric charging
infrastructure, policies allowing autonomous vehicles to be tested within the state, etc.).
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Implications for Other Industries
In addition to the new opportunities that arise from changes in the automobile industry,
the lessons learned from the Nissan-Canton and Toyota-Blue Springs cases can be adapted and
applied to new industries as well. These lessons can be which industries to target as well as how
to support other industries and facilitate their growth.
Transaction cost economics, and to an extent GVC theory, theorize that industries will try
to minimize costs over repeated transactions. In the automobile industry, this looks like Nissan
and Toyota having close relationships with their suppliers and those suppliers locating near the
factory. The close relationship with suppliers facilitates long term contracts which lower
transaction costs related to negotiation, and the proximity of suppliers to a final assembly plant
lowers the costs of repeated shipments.
These attributes of the automobile industry describe the theory behind Just-In-Time
production and explain why the automobile industry was able to facilitate economic
development. In the future, policy makers and government actors at all levels can target new
industries with the same implications of transaction costs in mind. For example, manufacturers
who utilize modular production and whose outsourced modules are quite large are likely to be
equally as powerful drivers of economic development as the automobile industry. Additionally,
industries which have repeated transactions with another firm/ industry may benefit from
establishing in the same region.
Outside of trying to secure large manufacturers and their suppliers, Mississippi can also
facilitate the growth of new firms that are not massive employers or drive suppliers. Local and
state level actors correctly identified that land, access to rails, access to interstates, and access to
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a sizable skilled labor pool were important to the automobile industry. Other firms within other
sectors of the economy have different sets of needs. Given the growing success of firms that
conduct business either partially or fully online, there is an opportunity to facilitate those firms
constructing office buildings within Mississippi or having their workers live in Mississippi and
work remotely. The transaction costs of these firms largely revolve around time and recruitment
of labor. As such, these firms and their workers may not require interstate access or a sizable
workforce, but they will require access to high speed internet and at least an adequate supply of
skilled workers. In order to reap some rewards from this growing sector of the economy, the state
should invest in infrastructure that facilitates these industries (ie. fiber optic access throughout
business areas and residential areas to allow work from home) and educational opportunities that
ensure these firms can access a workforce here.
Conclusion
The global economy is becoming an increasingly complex and diversified space. Inside
of it, there are numerous opportunities for how underdeveloped regions like Mississippi can spur
economic development into the future. In this thesis, I have given an account of why Mississippi
remained underdeveloped for so long, how we attempted to change it, and how the automobile
industry has begun to drive economic development. I then analyzed this last element of the story
through Global Value Chain theory and illuminated the role that state and local actors play in the
process. Though the road ahead is uncertain, this analysis makes it clear that local and state
actors can continue to bring development and prosperity to Mississippi through understanding
and targeting the needs of firms, either through infrastructure, advertising, negotiations, or a
combination of the three.
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